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Abstract
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in nondemocratic societies where institutions do not
enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political' power. The ruling
coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A
ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that
may challenge it and it needs to be self-enforcing, in the sense that none of its subcoalitions should be able
to secede and become the new ruling coalition. We present both an axiomatic approach that captures
these notions and determines a (generically) unique ruling coalition and the analysis of a dynamic game
of coalition formation that encompasses these ideas. We establish that the subgame perfect equilibria
of the coalition formation game coincide with the set of ruling coalitions resulting from the axiomatic
approach. A key insight of our analysis is that a coalition is made self-enforcing by the failure of its
winning subcoalitions to be self-enforcing. This is most simply illustrated by the following example: with
"majority rule," two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing and consequently, three-person
coalitions are self-enforcing (unless one player is disproportionately powerful). We also characterize the
structure of ruling coalitions. For example, we determine the conditions under which ruling coalitions
are robust to small changes in the distribution of power and when they are fragile. We also show that
when the distribution of power across individuals is relatively equal and there is majoritarian voting, only
certain sizes of coalitions (e.g., with "majority rule," coalitions of size 3, 7, 15, 31, etc.) can be the ruling
coalition.
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1 Introduction
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in a nondemocratic ("weakly institutionalized")
environment. A ruling coalition must be powerful enough to impose its wishes on the rest of the
society. A key ingredient of our analysis is that because of the absence of strong, well-functioning
institutions, binding agreements are not possible. 1 This has two important implications: first,
members of the ruling coalition cannot make binding offers on how resources will be distributed;
second, and more importantly, members of a candidate ruling coalition cannot commit to not
eliminating (sidelining) fellow members in the future. Consequently, there is always the danger
that, once a particular coalition has formed and has centralized power in its hands, a subcoalition
will try to remove some of the original members of the coalition in order to increase the share
of resources allocated to itself. Ruling coalitions must therefore not only be powerful enough to
be able to impose their wishes on the rest of the society, but also self-enforcing so that none
of their subcoalitions are powerful enough and wish to split from or eliminate the rest of this
coalition. These considerations imply that the nature of ruling coalitions is determined by a
tradeoff between "power" and "self-enforcement"
.
More formally, we consider a society consisting of an arbitrary number of individuals with
different amount of political or military powers ( "guns" ) . Any subset of these individuals can
form a coalition and the power of the coalition is equal to the sum of the powers of its members.
We formalize the interplay between power and self-enforcement as follows: a coalition with
sufficient power is winning against the rest of the society and can centralize decision-making
powers in its own hands (for example, eliminating the rest of the society from the decision-
making process). How powerful a coalition needs to be in order to be winning is determined
by a parameter a. When a = 1/2, this coalition simply needs to be more powerful than the
rest of the society, so this case can be thought of as "majority rule." When a > 1/2, the
coalition needs "supermajority" or more than a certain multiple of the power of the remainder
of the society. Once this first stage is completed, a subgroup can secede from or sideline the
rest of the initial winning coalition if it has enough power and wishes to do so. This process
continues until a self- enforcing coalition, which does not contain any subcoalitions that wish to
engage in further rounds of eliminations, emerges. Once this coalition, which we refer to as the
ultimate ruling coalition (URC), is formed, the society's resources are distributed according to
some pre-determined rule (for example, resources may be distributed among the members of this
1 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) provide a more detailed discussion and various examples of commitment
problems in political-decision making. The term weakly-institutionalized polities is introduced in Acemoglu,
Robinson, and Verdier (2004) to describe societies in which institutional rules do not constrain political interactions
among various social groups or factions.
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coalition according to their powers). This simple game formalizes the two key consequences of
weak institutions mentioned above: (1) binding agreements on how resources will be distributed
are not possible; (2) subcoalitions cannot commit to not sidelining their fellow members in a
particular coalition. 2
Our main results are as follows. First, we characterize the equilibria of this class of games
under general conditions. We show that a ruling coalition always exists and is "generically"
unique. Moreover, the equilibrium always satisfies some natural axioms that are motivated
by the power and self-enforcement considerations mentioned above. Therefore, our analysis
establishes the equivalence between an axiomatic approach to the formation of ruling coalitions
(which involves the characterization of a mapping that determines the ruling coalition for any
society and satisfies a number of natural axioms) and a noncooperative approach (which involves
characterizing the subgame perfect equilibria of a game of coalition formation). We also show
that the URC can be characterized recursively. Using this characterization, we establish the
following results on the structure of URCs.
1. Despite the simplicity of the environment, the URC can consist of any number of players,
and may include or exclude the most powerful individuals in the society. Consequently, the
equilibrium payoff of an individual is not monotonic in his power. The most powerful will
belong to the ruling coalition only if he is powerful enough to win by himself or weak enough to
be a part of a smaller self-enforcing coalition.
2. An increase in a, that is, an increase in the degree of supermajority needed to eliminate
'opponents, does not necessarily lead to larger URCs, because it stabilizes otherwise non-self-
enforcing subcoalitions, and as a result, destroys larger coalitions that would have been self-
enforcing for lower values of a.
3. Self-enforcing coalitions are generally "fragile." For example, under majority rule (i.e.,
a = 1/2), adding or subtracting one player from a self-enforcing coalition necessarily makes it
non-self-enforcing
.
4. Nevertheless, URCs are (generically) continuous in the distribution of power across indi-
viduals in the sense that a URC remains so when the powers of the players are perturbed.
5. Coalitions of certain sizes are more likely to emerge as the URC. For example, with
majority rule (a = 1/2) and a sufficiently equal distribution of powers among individuals, the
URC must have size 2 fc — 1 where k is an integer (i.e., 1, 3, 7, 15,...). A similar formula for the
size of the ruling coalition applies when a > 1/2.
"The game also introduces the feature that once a particular group of individuals has been sidelined, they
cannot be brought back into the ruling coalition. This feature is adopted for tractability.
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We next illustrate some of the main interactions using a simple example.
Example 1 Consider two agents A and B. Denote their powers 7,4 > and 75 > and assume
that the decision-making rule requires power-weighted majority, that is, a = 1/2. This implies
that if 7^4 > 7B , then starting with the coalition {A, B}, the agent A will form a majority by
himself. Conversely, if jA < -yB , then agent B will form a majority. Thus, "generically" (i.e.,
as long as 7^4 7^ 7S ), one of the members of the two-person coalition can secede and form a
subcoalition that is powerful enough within the original coalition. Since each agent will receive
a higher share of the scarce resources in a coalition that consists of only himself than in a
two-person coalition, two-person coalitions are generically not self-enforcing.
Now, consider a coalition consisting of three agents, A, B and C with powers 74, 7B and
Jq, and suppose that jA < jB < jc < 7,4 + 7b- Clearly, no two-person coalition is self-
enforcing. The lack of self-enforcing subcoalitions of {A, B, C} implies that {A, B, C} is itself
self-enforcing. To see this, suppose, for example, that {A, B} considers seceding from {A, B, C}.
They can do so since 7,4 + 7# > 7c- However, we know from the previous paragraph that the
subcoalition {A, B} is itself not self-enforcing, since after this coalition is established, agent B
would secede or eliminate A. Anticipating this, agent A would not support the subcoalition
{A, B}. A similar argument applies for all other subcoalitions. Moreover, since agent C is
not powerful enough to secede from the original coalition by himself, the three-person coalition
{A, B, C} is self-enforcing and will be the ruling coalition.
Next, consider a society consisting of four individuals, A, B, C and D. Suppose that we
have jA = 3,7# = 4,7^ = 5, and "fD = 10. D's power is insufficient to eliminate the coalition
{A, B,C} starting from the initial coalition {A, B,C}. Nevertheless, D is stronger than any
two of A, B, C. This implies that any three-person coalition that includes D would not be self-
enforcing. Anticipating this, any two of {A, B,C} would decline D's offer to secede. However,
{A, B, C} is self-enforcing, thus the three agents would be happy to eliminate D. Therefore, in
this example, the ruling coalition again consists of three individuals, but interestingly excludes
the most powerful individual D.
The most powerful individual is not always eliminated. Consider the society with 7^4 =
2,
7
B = 4,
7
C = 7 and 7D = 10. In this case, among the three-person coalitions only {B, C, D}
is self-enforcing, and it will eliminate the weakest individual, A, and become the ruling coalition.
This example also illustrates why three-person coalitions (22 — 1 = 3) may be more likely than
two-person (and also four-person) coalitions. 3
It also shows that in contrast to approaches with unrestricted side-payments (e.g., Riker, 1962), the ruling
coalition will not generally be a minimal winning coalition (the unique minimum winning coalition is {A, D},
Although our model is abstract, it captures a range of economic forces that appear salient
in nondemocratic, weakly-institutionalized polities. The historical example of Stalin's Soviet
Russia illustrates this in a particularly clear manner. The Communist Party Politburo was the
highest ruling body of the Soviet Union. All top government positions were held by its members.
Though formally its members were elected at Party meetings, for all practical purposes the
Politburo determined the fates of its members, as well as those of ordinary citizens. Soviet
archives contain execution lists signed by Politburo members; sometimes a list would contain
one name, but some lists from the period of 1937-39 contained hundreds or even thousands
names (Conquest, 1968).
Of 40 Politburo members (28 full, 12 non-voting) appointed between 1919 and 1952, only 12
survived through 1952. Of these 12, 11 continued to hold top positions after Stalin's death in
March 1953. There was a single Politburo member (Petrovsky) in 33 years who left the body
and survived. Of the 28 deaths, there were 17 executions decided by the Politburo, 2 suicides,
I death in prison immediately after arrest, and 1 assassination.
To interpret the interactions among Politburo members through the lenses of our model,
imagine that the Politburo consists of five members, and to illustrate our main points, suppose
that their powers are given by {3,4,5, 10,20}. It can be verified that with a = 1/2, this five-
member coalition is self-enforcing. However, if either of the lower power individuals, 3,4,5, or
10, dies or is eliminated, then the ruling coalition consists of the singleton, 20. If, instead, 20
dies, the ultimate ruling coalition becomes {3, 4, 5} and eliminates the remaining most powerful
individual 10. This is because 10 is unable to form an alliance with less powerful players. While
the reality of Soviet politics in the first half of the century is naturally much more complicated,
this simple example sheds light on three critical episodes.
The first episode is the suicides of two members of the Politburo, Tomsky and Ordzhonikidze,
during 1937-38. An immediate implication of these suicides was a change in the balance of power,
something akin to the elimination of 5 in the {3, 4, 5, 10, 20} example above. In less than a year,
II current or former members of Politburo were executed. Consistent with the ideas emphasized
in our model, some of those executed in 1939 (e.g., Chubar, Kosior, Postyshev, and Ezhov) had
earlier voted for the execution of Bukharin and Rykov in 1937. The second episode followed
the death of Alexei Zhdanov in 1948 from a heart attack. Until Zhdanov's death, there was a
period of relative "peace" : no member of this body had been executed in nine years. Montefiore
(2003) describes how the Zhdanov's death immediately changed the balance in the Politburo.
The death gave Beria and Malenkov the possibility to have Zhdanov's supporters and associates
vhich has the minimum power among all winning coalitions).
in the government executed.4 The third episode followed the death of Stalin himself in March
1953. Since the bloody purge of 1948, powerful Politburo members conspired in resisting any
attempts by Stalin to have any of them condemned and executed. When in the Fall of 1952,
Stalin charged two old Politburo members, Molotov and Mikoian, with being the "enemies of
the people," the other members stood firm and blocked a possible trial (see Montefiore, 2003, or
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, 2004). After Stalin's death, Beria became the most powerful politician
in Russia. He was immediately appointed the first deputy prime-minister as well as the head
of the ministry of internal affairs and of the ministry of state security, the two most powerful
ministries in the USSR. His ally Malenkov was appointed prime-minister, and no one succeeded
Stalin as the Secretary General of the Communist Party. Yet in only 4 months, the all-powerful
Beria fell victim of a military coup by his fellow Politburo members, was tried and executed. In
terms of our simple example with powers {3, 4, 5, 10, 20}, Beria would correspond to 10. After
20 (Stalin) is out of the picture, {3, 4, 5} becomes the ultimate ruling coalition, so 10 must be
eliminated.
Similar issues arise in other dictatorships when top figures were concerned with others becom-
ing too powerful. These considerations also appear to be particularly important in international
relations, especially when agreements have to be reached under the shadow of the threat of
war (e.g., Powell, 1999). For example, following both World Wars, many important features of
the peace agreements were influenced by the desire that the emerging balance of power among
states should be self-enforcing. In this context, small states were viewed as attractive because
they could combine to contain threats from larger states but they would be unable to become
dominant players. Similar considerations were paramount after Napoleon's ultimate defeat in
1815. In this case, the victorious nations designed the new political map of Europe at the
Vienna Congress, and special attention was paid to balancing the powers of Britain, Germany
and Russia, to ensure that "... their equilibrium behaviour... maintain the Vienna settlement"
(Slantchev, 2005). 5
Our paper is related to models of bargaining over resources, particularly in the context of
political decision-making (e.g., models of legislative bargaining such as Baron and Ferejohn,
1989, Calvert and Dietz, 1996, Jackson and Moselle, 2002). Our approach differs from these
papers, since we do not impose any specific bargaining structure and focus on self-enforcing
In contrast to the two other episodes from the Soviet Politburo we discuss here, the elimination of the
associates of Zhadanov could also be explained by competition between two groups within the Politburo rather
than by competition among all members and lack of commitment, which are the ideas emphasized by our model.
5 Other examples of potential applications of our model in political games are provided in Pepinsky (2007),
who uses our model to discuss issues of coalition formation in nondemocratic societies.
ruling coalitions. 6
More closely related to our work are the models of on equilibrium coalition formation, which
combine elements from both cooperative and noncooperative game theory (e.g., Peleg, 1980,
Hart and Kurz, 1983, Greenberg and Weber, 1993, Chwe, 1994, Bloch, 1996, Mariotti, 1997,
Ray, 2007, Ray and Vohra, 1997, 1999, 2001, Seidmann and Winter, 1998, Konishi and Ray, 2001,
Maskin, 2003, Eguia, 2006, Pycia, 2006). The most important difference between our approach
and the previous literature on coalition formation is that, motivated by political settings, we
assume that the majority (or supermajority) of the members of the society can impose their
will on those players who are not a part of the majority. This feature both changes the nature
of the game and also introduces "negative externalities" as opposed to the positive externalities
and free-rider problems upon which the previous literature focuses (Ray and Vohra, 1999, and
Maskin, 2003). A second important difference is that most of these works assume the possibility
of binding commitments (Ray and Vohra, 1997, 1999), while we suppose that players have
no commitment power. Despite these differences, there are important parallels between our
results and the insights of this literature. For example, Ray (1979) and Ray and Vohra (1997,
1999) emphasize that the internal stability of a coalition influences whether it can block the
formation of other poalitions, including the grand coalition. In the related context of risk-sharing
arrangements, Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2006) show that stability of subgroups threatens the
stability of a larger group. 7 Another related approach to coalition formation is developed by
Moldovanu and Winter (1995), who study a game in which decisions require appoval by all
members of a coalition and show the relationship of the resulting allocations to the core of a
related cooperative game. 8 Finally, Skaperdas (1998) and Tan and Wang (1999) investigate
coalition formation in dynamic contests. Nevertheless, none of these papers study self-enforcing
coalitions in political games without commitment, or derive existence, generic uniqueness and
characterization results similar to those in our paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal setup. Section
3 provides our axiomatic treatment. Section 4 characterizes subgame perfect equilibria of the
6 See also Perry and Reny (1994), Moldovanu and Jehiel (1999), and Gomes and Jehiel (2005) for models of
bargaining with a coalition structure.
' In this respect, our paper is also related to work on "coalition-proof Nash equilibrium or rationalizability,
e.g., Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), Moldovanu (1992), Ambrus (2006). These papers allow deviations
by coalitions in noncooperative games, but impose that only stable coalitions can form. In contrast, these
considerations are captured in our model by the game of coalition formation and by the axiomatic analysis.
Our game can also be viewed as a "hedonic game" since the utility of each player is determined by the
composition of the ultimate coalition he belongs to. However, it is not a special case of hedonic games defined
and studied in Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), Banerjee, Konishi, and Sonmez (2001), and Barbera and Gerber
(2007), because of the dynamic interactions introduced by the self-enforcement considerations. See Le Breton,
Ortuno-Ortin, and Weber (2008) for an application of hedonic games to coalition formation.
extensive-form game of coalition formation. It then establishes the equivalence between the
ruling coalition of Section 3 and the equilibria of this extensive-form game. Section 5 contains
our main results on the nature and structure of ruling coalitions in political games. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of all the results presented in the text.
2 The Political Game
Let X denote the collection of all individuals, which is assumed to be finite. The non-empty
subsets of I are coalitions and the set of coalitions is denoted by C. In addition, for any X C X,
Cx denotes the set of coalitions that are subsets of X and \X\ is the number of members in X.
In each period there is a designated ruling coalition, which can change over time. The game
starts with ruling coalition N, and eventually the ultimate ruling coalition (URC) forms. We
assume that if the URC is X, then player i obtains baseline utility Wi (X) £ R. We denote
w(-) = {wi{-)}ieI .
Our focus is on how differences in the powers of individuals map into political decisions. We
define a power mapping to summarize the powers of different individuals in I:
7 :J H-+!
where R++ = R+ \ {0}. We refer to 7, = 7(2) as the political power of individual i 6 I,
In addition, we denote the set of all possible power mappings by 1Z and a power mapping 7
restricted to some coalition N C T by j\n (or by 7 when the reference to N is clear). The power
of a coalition X is 7^ = Yltex 7r
Coalition Y C X is winning within coalition X if and only if jy > ajxi where a £ [1/2, 1)
is a fixed parameter referring to the degree of (weighted) supermajority. Naturally, a = 1/2
corresponds to majority rule. Moreover, since J is finite, there exists a large enough a (still less
than 1) that corresponds to unanimity rule. We denote the set of coalitions that are winning
within X by WX - Since a > 1/2, if Y, Z £ WX , then Y D Z ^ 0.
The assumption that payoffs are given by the mapping w (•) implies that a coalition cannot
commit to a redistribution of resources or payoffs among its members (for example, a coalition
consisting of two individuals with powers 1 and 10 cannot commit to share the resource equally
if it becomes the URC). We assume that the baseline payoff functions, W{ (X) : 1 x C —> R for
any i £ N, satisfy the following properties.
Assumption 1 Let i £ 1 and X,Y 6 C. Then:
(1) If i £ X and i <£ Y, then W{ (X) > W{ (Y) /i.e., each player prefers to be part of the
URC].
(2) ForieX andieY , Wi{X) > iu; (Y) «=> 7^/7* > 7^7^ ( <=^> lx < 7y ) [i.e., for
any two URCs that he is part of, each player prefers the one where his relative power is greater].
(3) If i £ X and i £ Y, then wt (X) = W{ (Y) = w~ [i.e., a player is indifferent between
URCs he is not part of].
This assumption is natural and captures the idea that each player's payoff depends positively
on his relative strength in the URC. A specific example of function w () that satisfies these
requirements is sharing of a pie between members of the ultimate ruling coalition proportional
to their power:
(x)= fxn{i} = ( Jihx Hi ex
The reader may want to assume (1) throughout the text for interpretation purposes, though this
specific functional form is not used in any of our results or proofs.
We next define the extensive-form complete information game T = (N,j\n,w(-)
,
a), where
TV G C is the initial coalition, 7 is the power mapping, w () is a payoff mapping that satisfies
Assumption 1, and a G [1/2, 1) is the degree of supermajority; denote the collection of such
games by Q. Also, let e > be sufficiently small such that for any i G N and any X, Y G C, we
have
Wi (X) > Wi (Y) =» Wi (X) > Wi (Y) + 2e (2)
(this holds for sufficiently small e > since I is a finite set). This immediately implies that for
any X G C with i G X, we have
wt (X) - wT > e. (3)
The extensive form of the game V = {N,~f\x,w (•) ,a) is as follows. Each stage j of the game
starts with some ruling coalition Nj (at the beginning of the game iVo = N). Then the stage
game proceeds with the following steps:
1. Nature randomly picks agenda setter aj
>q
G Nj for q = 1.
2. [Agenda-setting step] Agenda setter a^ makes proposal Pj
tQ G Cjv,- , which is a subcoalition
of Nj such that aJj9 G Pj iq (for simplicity, we assume that a player cannot propose to eliminate
himself)
.
3. [Voting step] Players in Pj
tQ vote sequentially over the proposal (we assume that players in
Nj \ PjiQ automatically vote against this proposal). More specifically, Nature randomly chooses
the first voter, Ujo.i, who then casts his vote vote v (fj/,g ,i) G {y,n} (Yes or No), then Nature
chooses the second voter Uj,
9)2 7^ ^',9,11 e^c - After all \Pj tq\ players have voted, the game proceeds
to step 4 if players who supported the proposal form a winning coalition within Nj (i.e., if
{i G Pj,q : v (i) = y} G Wjv,)i and otherwise it proceeds to step 5.
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4. If Pj
tQ
= Nj, then the game proceeds to step 6. Otherwise, players from Nj \ Pj tq are
eliminated and the game proceeds to step 1 with Nj+i = PjA (and j increases by 1 as a new
transition has taken place).
5. If q < \Nj\, then next agenda setter aj,9+i £ Nj is randomly picked by Nature among
members of Nj who have not yet proposed at this stage (so aj,9+i ^ ajjT for 1 < r < q), and the
game proceeds to step 2 (with q increased by 1). If q = \Nj\, the game proceeds to step 6.
6. Nj becomes the ultimate ruling coalition. Each player i € N receives total payoff
Ui = wi(Nj)-eJ2
1<k<j
I{ieNk}, (4)
where Ii-.i is the indicator function taking the value of or 1.
The payoff function (4) captures the idea that an individual's overall utility is the difference
between the baseline W{ (•) and disutility from the number of transitions (rounds of elimination)
this individual is involved in. The arbitrarily small cost e can be interpreted as a cost of
eliminating some of the players from the coalition or as an organizational cost that individuals
have to pay each time a new coalition is formed. Alternatively, e may be viewed as a means
to refine out equilibria where order of moves matters for the outcome. Note that V is a finite
game: the total Dumber of moves, including those of Nature, does not exceed 4|iV| . Notice
also that this game form introduces sequential voting in order to avoid issues of individuals
playing weakly-dominated strategies. Our analysis below will establish that the main results
hold regardless of the specific order of votes chosen by Nature. 9
3 Axiomatic Analysis
Before characterizing the equilibria of the dynamic game T, we take a brief detour and introduce
four axioms motivated by the structure of the game T. Although these axioms are motivated
by game T, they can also be viewed as natural axioms to capture the salient economic forces
discussed in the introduction. The analysis in this section identifies an outcome mapping $ : Q =4
C that satisfies these axioms and determines the set of (admissible) URCs corresponding to each
game T. This analysis will be useful for two reasons. First, it will reveal certain attractive
features of the game presented in the previous section. Second, we will show in the next section
that equilibrium URCs of this game coincide with the outcomes picked by the mapping $.
More formally, consider the set of games F = (TV, ^\n, w (•) , a ) 6 Q- Holding 7, w and a
fixed, consider the correspondence
<fr : C =1 C defined by <f> (TV) = $ (TV, 7|yv, w, a) for any N E C.
See Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2006) both for the analysis of a game with simultaneous voting and a
stronger equilibrium notion, and for an example showing how, in the absence of the cost e > 0, the order of moves
may matter.
We adopt the following axioms on'
<f>
(or alternatively on $).
Axiom 1 (Inclusion) For any X EC,
<f>
(X) ^ and if Y E <p (X), then Y C X.
Axiom 2 (Power) For any X E C, Y E 4> [X) only if Y E %.
Axiom 3 (Self-Enforcement) For any X E C, Y E <p {X) only if Y E <j> (Y).
[
Axiom 4 (Rationality) For any X E C, for any Y E 4>{X) and for any Z C X such that
Z E Wx and Z E <j> (Z), we have that Z <£ 4>{X) <=> iY < 7Z .
Motivated by Axiom 3, we define the notion of a self-enforcing coalition as a coalition that
"selects itself . This notion will be used repeatedly in the rest of the paper.
Definition 1 Coalition X E P (X) is self-enforcing if X E
<fi (X).
Axiom 1, inclusion, implies that <j> maps into subcoalitions of the coalition in question (and
that it is defined, i.e.,
<f>
(X) ^= 0). It therefore captures the feature introduced in T that players
that have been eliminated (sidelined) cannot rejoin the ruling coalition. Axiom 2, the power
axiom, requires a ruling coalition be a winning coalition. Axiom 3, the self-enforcement axiom,
captures the key interactions in our model. It requires that any coalition Y E 4> (X) should be
self-enforcing according to Definition 1. This property corresponds to the notion that in terms
,
of game T, if coalition Y is reached along the equilibrium path, then there should not be any
deviations from it. Finally, Axiom 4 requires that if two coalitions Y,Z C X are both winning
and self-enforcing and all players in7nZ strictly prefer Y to Z, then Z £ cfi (X) (i.e., Z cannot
be the selected coalition) . Intuitively, all members of winning coalition Y (both those mY(~\Z
by assumption and those in Y \ Z because they prefer to be in the URC) strictly prefer Y to Z;
hence, Z should not be chosen in favor of Y. This interpretation allows us to call Axiom 4 the
Rationality Axiom. In terms of game T, this axiom captures the notion that, when he has the
choice, a player will propose a coalition in which his payoff is greater.
At the first glance, Axioms 1-4 may appear relatively mild. Nevertheless, they are strong
enough to pin down a unique mapping
<f>. Moreover, under the following assumption, these
axioms also imply that this unique mapping cp is single valued.
Assumption 2 The power mapping 7 is generic in the sense that iffor any X,Y E C, 7^ = 7y
implies X = Y. We also say that coalition N is generic or that numbers {7;}je /v are 9eneric if
mapping 7^ is generic.
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Intuitively, this assumption rules out distributions of powers among individuals such that two
different coalitions have exactly the same total power. Notice that mathematically, genericity
assumption is without much loss of generality since the set of vectors {ji}i
€
j € ^++ that are
not generic has Lebesgue measure (in fact, it is a union of a finite number of hyperplanes in
R&).
Theorem 1 Fix a collection of players 1, a power mapping 7, a payoff function w (•) such that
Assumption 1 holds, and a £ [1/2, 1). Then:
1. There exists a unique mapping cp that satisfies Axioms 1^4. Moreover, when 7 is generic
(i.e. under Assumption 2), <fi is single-valued.
2. This mapping
<f>
may be obtained by the following inductive procedure. For any k E N, let
C k = {X £ C : \X\ = fc}. Clearly, C = Uk€NC k . If X e C 1 , then let <f>(X) = {X}. If 4>{Z) has
been defined for all Z 6 Cn for all n < k, then define 4> (X) for X 6 C k as
4>(X)= argmin 7^, (5)
AeM(X)u{X}
where
M (X) = {Z e Cx \ {X} :Z£Wx andZe4> (Z)} . (6)
Proceeding inductively 4> (X) is defined for all X G C.
The intuition for the inductive procedure is as follows. For each X, (6) defines M. (X) as
the set of proper subcoalitions which are both winning and self-enforcing. Equation (5) then
picks the coalitions in M. (X) that have the least power. When there are no proper winning and
self-enforcing subcoalitions, M (X) is empty and X becomes the URC), which is captured by
(5). The proof of this theorem, like all other proofs, is in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 establishes not only that <\> is uniquely defined, but also that when Assumption
2 holds, it is single-valued. In this case, with a slight abuse of notation, we write
<f> (X) = Y
instead of (X) = {Y}.
Corollary 1 Take any collection of players 1, power mapping 7, payoff function w (), and
a 6 [1/2, 1). Let <f> be the unique mapping satisfying Axioms 1^4. Then for any X,Y,Z G C,
Y,Z £ (p (X) implies 7y = 7^. Coalition N is self- enforcing, that is, N € <f> (N), if and only if
there exists no coalition X C N, X j^ N, that is winning within N and self- enforcing. Moreover,
if N is self- enforcing, then (p(N) = {N}.
Corollary 1, which immediately follows from (5) and (6), summarizes the basic results on self-
enforcing coalitions. In particular, Corollary 1 says that a coalition that includes a winning and
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self-enforcing subcoalition cannot be self-enforcing. This captures the notion that the stability
of smaller coalitions undermines the stability of larger ones.
As an illustration to Theorem 1, consider again three players A, B and C and suppose that
a = 1/2. For any 7a < 7b < 7c < 7,4 + 7b> Assumption 2 is satisfied and it is easy to see
that {A}, {B}, {C}, and {A, B,C} are self-enforcing coalitions, whereas 4>{{A, B}) = {B},
4> ({A, C}) = (p ({B, C}) = {C}. In this case, cfi (X) is a singleton for any X. On the other hand,
if jA = 7B = 7C , all coalitions except {A, B, C} would be self-enforcing, while <f> ({A, B, C}) =
{{A, B}
,
{B, C}
,
{A, C}} in this case.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
We now characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) of game T defined in Section 2 and
show that they correspond to the ruling coalitions identified by the axiomatic analysis in the
previous section. The next subsection provides the main results. We then provide a sketch of
the proofs. The formal proofs are contained in the Appendix.
4.1 Main Results
The following two' theorems characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of game T =
(-W) i\n, w , Oi) with initial coalition N. As usual, a strategy profile o in T is a SPE if a induces
continuation strategies that are best responses to each other starting in any subgame of T,
denoted Th, where h denotes the history of the game, consisting of actions in past periods
(stages and steps).
Theorem 2 Suppose that <j> (N) satisfies Axioms 1-4 (cfr. (5) in Theorem 1). Then, for any
K £ <j) (N), there exists a pure strategy profile ctk that is an SPE and leads to URC K in at
most one transition. In this equilibrium player i £ N receives payoff
Ui = Wi (K) - eI{iex}I{A^K}- (7)
This equilibrium payoff does not depend on the random moves by Nature.
Theorem 2 establishes that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium leading to any coalition
that is in the set <p (TV) denned in the axiomatic analysis of Theorem 1. This is intuitive in view
of the analysis in the previous section: when each player anticipates members of a self-enforcing
ruling coalition to play a strategy profile such that they will turn down any offers other than K
It can also be verified that Theorem 2 holds even when e = 0. The assumption that e > is used in Theorem
3.
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and they will accept K, it is in the interest of all the players in K to play such a strategy for any
history. This follows because the definition of the set <j> (N) implies that only deviations that
lead to ruling coalitions that are not self-enforcing or not winning could be profitable. But the
first option is ruled out by induction while a deviation to a non-winning URC will be blocked
by sufficiently many players. The payoff in (7) is also intuitive. Each player receives his baseline
payoff Wi (K) resulting from URC K and then incurs the cost e if he is part of K and if the
initial coalition N is not equal to K (because in this latter case, there will be one transition).
Notice that Theorem 2 is stated without Assumption 2 and does not establish uniqueness. The
next theorem strengthens these results under Assumption 2.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 2 holds and suppose (f>(N) = K. Then any (pure or mixed
strategy) SPE results in K as the URC. The payoff player i G N receives in this equilibrium is
given by (7).
Since Assumption 2 holds, the mapping
<f>
is single-valued (with <fi(N) = K). Theorem 3
then shows that even though the SPE may not be unique in this case, any SPE will lead to
K as the URC. This is intuitive in view of our discussion above. Because any SPE is obtained
by backward induction, multiplicity of equilibria results only when some player is indifferent
between multiple actions at a certain nod. However, as we show, this may only happen when a
player has no effect on equilibrium play and his choice between different actions has no effect on
URC (in particular, since (f> is single-valued in this case, a player cannot be indifferent between
actions that will lead to different URCs).
It is also worth noting that the SPE in Theorems 2 and 3 is "coalition-proof. Since the
game T incorporates both dynamic and coalitional effects and is finite, the relevant concept of
coalition-proofness is Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston's (1987) Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash
Equilibrium (PCPNE). This equilibrium refinement requires that the candidate equilibrium
should be robust to deviations by coalitions in all subgames when the players take into account
the possibility of further deviations. Since T introduces more general coalitional deviations
explicitly, it is natural to expect the SPE in T to be PCPNE. Indeed, if Assumption 2 holds, it
is straightforward to prove that the set of PCPNE coincides with the set of SPE. 11
4.2 Sketch of the Proofs
We now provide an outline of the argument leading to the proofs of the main results presented
in the previous subsection and we present two key lemmas that are central for these theorems.
11 A formal proof of this result follows from Lemma 2 below and is available from the authors upon request.
13
Consider the game T and let
<fi be as defined in (5). Take any coalition K 6 <j> {N). We will
outline the construction of the pure strategy profile ax which will be a SPE and lead to K as
the URC.
Let us first rank all coalitions so as to "break ties" (which are possible, since we have not yet
imposed Assumption 2). In particular, n : C <— {!,..'., 2^ — l} be a one-to-one mapping such
that for any X, Y
€
C,
'Jx > 1y ^ n PO > n 00 > an<^ ^ f°r some X ^ K we have 7^ = 7^-,
then n(X) > n(K) (how the ties among other coalitions are broken is not important). With
this mapping, we have thus ranked (enumerated) all coalitions such that stronger coalitions are
given higher numbers, and coalition K receives the smallest number among all coalitions with
the same power. Now define the mapping x ' C —> C as
X (X) = argminn(y). (8)
Y&4>(X)
Intuitively, this mapping picks an element of tf> (X) for any X and satisfies x (N) = K- Also,
note that x 1S a projection in the sense that x (x (-^0) = X (X). This follows immediately since
Axiom 3 implies x (X) 6 ef> (x (X)) and Corollary 1 implies that 4> {x (X)) is a singleton.
The key to constructing a SPE is to consider off-equilibrium path behavior. To do this,
consider a subgame in which we have reached a coalition X (i.e., j transitions have occurred
»
and Nj = X) and let us try to determine what the URC would be if proposal Y is accepted
starting in this subgame. If Y = X, then the game will end, and thus X will be the URC. If,
on the other hand, Y 7^ X, then the URC must be some subset of Y. Let us define the strategy
profile ok such that the URC will be x(F). We denote this (potentially off-equilibrium path)
URC following the acceptance of proposal Y by tpx 00 1 so that
Vx[n
\ X otherwise. [ ">
By Axiom 1 and equations (8) and (9), we have that
X = Y <^=» ipx (Y)=X. (10)
We will introduce one final concept before denning profile ax- Let Fx {i) denote the "fa-
vorite" coalition of player i if the current ruling coalition is X. Naturally, this will be the weakest
coalition among coalitions that are winning within X, that are self-enforcing and that include
player i. If there are several such coalitions, the definition of Fx (i) picks the one with the
smallest n, and if there are none, it picks X itself. Therefore,
Fx (i)= argmin n (Y)
.
(11)
Ye{Z:ZcX,Z€Wx,x(Z)=Z,Z3i}U{X}
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Similarly, we define the "favorite" coalition of players Y C X starting with X at the current
stage. This is again the weakest coalition among those favored by members of Y, thus
{argmin n (Z) iiY^0;
{Z-3ieY:Fx (i)=Z} (12)
X otherwise.
Equation (12) immediately implies that
For all X
€
C : Fx (0) = X and Fx (X) =x(X). (13)
The first part is true by definition. The second part follows, since for all i 6 x{X), x(X)
is feasible in the minimization (11), and it has the lowest number n among all winning self-
enforcing coalitions by (8) and (5) (otherwise there would exist a self-enforcing coalition Z that
is winning within X and satisfies 7Z < 7X (A')> which would imply that <fi violates Axiom 4).
Therefore, it is the favorite coalition of all i £ x (X) and thus Fx (X) = x (X).
Now we are ready to define profile a^. Take any history h and denote the player who is
supposed to move after this history a = a(h) if after h, we are at an agenda-setting step, and
v = v (h) if we are at a voting step deciding on some proposal P (and in this case, let a be the
agenda-setter who made proposal P). Also denote the set of potential agenda setters at this
stage of the game by A. Finally, recall that n denotes a vote of "No" and y is a vote of "Yes".
Then ok is the following simple strategy profile where each agenda setter proposes his favorite
coalition in the continuation game (given current coalition X) and each voter votes "No" against
proposal P if the URC following P excludes him or he expects another proposal that he will
prefer to come shortly.
{agenda-setter a proposes P = Fx (a)
;
(
_
if either v £ ipx (P) or
voter v votes
<^
v £ Fx (A) , P f Fx (A U {a}) , and 1fx (A) < 1->I>X {F)\
\ y otherwise.
(14)
In particular, notice that v £ Fx (A) and P ^ Fx (AU {a}) imply that voter v is part of a
different coalition proposal that will be made by some future agenda setter at this stage of
the game if the current voting fails, and
^PxiA) — lib (P) implies that this voter will receive
weakly higher payoff under this alternative proposal. This expression makes it clear that <jk is
similar to a "truth-telling" strategy; each individual makes proposals according to his preferences
(constrained by what is feasible) and votes truthfully.
With the strategy profile &k defined, we can state the main lemma, which will essentially
constitute the bulk of the proof of Theorem 2. For this lemma, also denote the set of voters
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who already voted "Yes" at history h by V+
,
the set of voters who already voted "No" by V .
Then, V = P \ (V+ U V~ U {v}) denotes the set of voters who will vote after player v.
Lemma 1 Consider the subgame Th of game T after history h in which there were exactly jh
transitions and let the current coalition be X. Suppose that strategy profile ax defined in (14)
is played in Th- Then:
(a) If h is at agenda-setting step, the URC is R = Fx (A U {a}),' if h is at voting step
and V+ U {i
€
{v} UV : i votes y in ax} 6 Wx, then the URC is R = tpx (P)> an<^ otherwise
R = FX (A).
(b) If h is at the voting step and proposal P will be accepted, player i e X receives payoff
Ui = Wi (R) - e (jh + 1{p^x) (!{ieP} + ^R^pfyeR})) (!5)
Otherwise (if proposal P will be rejected or if h is at agenda-setting step), then player i G X
receives payoff
Ui = Wi (R) - £ (jh + I{RjLX}I{i€R}) (16)
The intuition for the results in this lemma is straightforward in view of the construction
of the strategy profile ok- In particular, part (a) defines what the URC will be. This follows
immediately from 'o~k- For example, if we are at an agenda-setting step, then the URC will be the
favorite coalition of the set of remaining agenda setters, given by A U {a}. This is an immediate
implication of the fact that according to the strategy profile ctk , each player will propose his
favorite coalition and voters will vote n ( "No" ) against current proposals if the strategy profile
o~k will induce a more preferred outcome for them in the remainder of this stage. Part (b)
simply defines the payoff to each player as the difference between the baseline payoff, Wi (R), as
a function of the URC R defined in part (a), and the costs associated with transitions.
Given Lemma 1, Theorem 2 then follows if strategy profile ax is a SPE (because in this case
URC will be K and it will be reached with at most one transition). With ax defined in (14), it
is clear that no player can profitably deviate in any subgame.
The next lemma strengthens Lemma 1 for the case in which Assumption 2 holds by estab-
lishing that any SPE will lead to the same URC and payoffs as those in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 2 holds and 4>(N) = {K}. Let ax be defined in (14)- Then
for any SPE a (in pure or mixed strategies) and for any history h, the equilibrium plays induced
by a and by ax in the subgame T^, will lead to the same URC and to identical payoffs for each
player.
Since <p (N) = {K}, Theorem 3 follows as an immediate corollary of this lemma (with h = 0).
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5 The Structure of Ruling Coalitions
In this section, we present several results on the structure of URCs. Given the equivalence
result (Theorems 2 and 3), we will make use of the axiomatic characterization in Theorem
1. Throughout, unless stated otherwise, we fix a game T = (N, j, w () , a) with w satisfying
Assumption 1 and a G [1/2, 1). In addition, to simplify the analysis in this section, we assume
throughout that Assumption 2 holds and we also impose:
Assumption 3 For no X, Y 6 C such that X CY the equality 7y = ocyx is satisfied.
Assumption 3 guarantees that a small perturbation of a non-winning coalition Y does not
make it winning. Similar to Assumption 2, this assumption fails only in a set of Lebesgue
measure (in fact, it coincides with Assumption 2 when a = 1/2). All proofs are again
provided in the Appendix.
5.1 Robustness
We start with the result that the set of self-enforcing coalitions is open (in the standard topol-
ogy); this is not only interesting per se but facilitates further proofs. Note that for game
T = (N, 7, w (•) , a), a power mapping 7 (or more explicitly j\n) is given by a \N\ -dimensional
vector {7i}j
€
7v C IR++- Den°te the subset of vectors {7i} i6^ that satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3
by A {N), and the subset of A (TV) for which <E> (TV, {7j}jejv 1 w > a) = N (i.e., the subset of power
distributions for which coalition N is stable) by S (N) and let J\f (N) = A(N) \ S (N).
Lemma 3 1. The set of power allocations that satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3, A (N), its subsets
for which coalition N is self- enforcing, S (TV), and its subsets for which coalition N is not self-
enforcing, A/" (AT), are open sets in K+i- The set A(N) is also dense in R++.
2. Each connected component ofA(N) lies entirely within either S (N) orAf(N).
An immediate corollary of Lemma 3 is that if the distributions of powers in two different
games are "close," then these two games will have the same URC and also that the inclusion of
sufficiently weak players will not change the URC. To state and prove this proposition, endow
the set of mappings 7, 1Z, with the sup-metric, so that (TZ, p) is a metric space with ^(7,7') =
supi€j |7j — 7i|. A ^-neighborhood of 7 is {7' e H : p (7, 7') < 6}.
Proposition 1 Consider T = (N, 7, w (•) , a) with a 6 [1/2, 1). Then:
1. There exists 6 > such that if 7' : N —> K++ lies within 5-neighborhood of 7, then
$ (N, 7, w,a) = $ (TV, 7', w, a).
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2. There exists 5' > such that if a' £ [1/2, 1) satisfies \a! — a\ < 6', then <E> (N, 7, w,a) =
$ (iV,7, w, a').
3. Let N = N\ U N2 with N\ and N2 disjoint. Then, there exists 5 > such that for all N2
with jN2 < 8, <f> (TVi) = <j> (JVi U N2 ).
This proposition is intuitive in view of the results in Lemma 3. It implies that URCs have
some degree of continuity and will not change as a result of small changes in power or in the
rules of the game.
5.2 Fragility of Self-Enforcing Coalitions
Although the structure of ruling coalitions is robust to small changes in the distribution of power
within the society, it may be fragile to more sizeable shocks. The next proposition shows that
in fact the addition or the elimination of a single member of the self-enforcing coalition turns
out, to be such a sizable shock when a = 1/2.
Proposition 2 Suppose a = 1/2 and fix a power mapping 7 : 1 —* R++. Then:
1. If coalitions X and Y such that X n Y = are both self- enforcing, then coalition X UY
is not self- enforcing.
2. If X is a self- enforcing coalition, then X U {i} for i £ X and X \ {i} for i £ X are not
self- enforcing.
The most important implication is that, under majority rule a = 1/2, the addition or the
elimination of a single agent from a self-enforcing coalition makes this coalition no longer self-
enforcing. This result motivates our interpretation in the Introduction of the power struggles in
Soviet Russia following random deaths of Politburo members.
5.3 Size of Ruling Coalitions
Proposition 3 Consider T = (TV, 7, w (•) , a).
1. Suppose a = 1/2, then for any n and m such that 1 < m < n, m ^ 2, there exists a set of
players N, \N\ = n, and a generic mapping of powers 7 such that \cp(N)\ = m. In particular,
for any m ^ 2 there exists a self- enforcing ruling coalition of size m. However, there is no
self- enforcing coalition of size 2.
2. Suppose that a > 1/2, then for any n and m such that 1 < m < n, there exists a set of
players N, \N\ = n, and a generic mapping of powers 7 such that \<j>(N)\ = m.
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These results show that one can say relatively little about the size and composition of URCs
without specifying the power distribution within the society further (except that when a = 1/2,
coalitions of size 2 are not self-enforcing). However, this is largely due to the fact that there can
be very unequal distributions of power. For the potentially more interesting case in which the
distribution of power within the society is relatively equal, much more can be said about the
size of ruling coalitions. In particular, the following proposition shows that, as long as larger
coalitions have more power and there is majority rule (a == 1/2), only coalitions of size 2 fc — 1
for some integer k (i.e., coalitions of size 3, 7, 15, etc.) can be the URC (Part 1). Part 2 of the
proposition provides a sufficient condition for this premise (larger coalitions are more powerful)
to hold. The rest of the proposition generalizes these results to societies with values of a > 1/2.
Proposition 4 Consider T = (N, 7, w (•) , a) with a £ [1/2, 1).
1. Let a = 1/2 and suppose that for any two coalitions X,Y £ C such that \X\ > \Y\ we have
Ix > 7y (i- e -, larger coalitions have greater power). Then <f>(N) = N if and only if \N\ = km
where km = 2m - 1, m 6 Z. Moreover, under these conditions, any ruling coalition must have
size km = 2
m
— 1 for some m £ Z.
2. For the condition \/X,Y
€ C : \X\ > \Y\ => 7^ > 7y to hold, it is sufficient that there
exists some A > such that
\N\
EIt- 1^ 1 - (17)
3. Suppose a £ [1/2, 1) and suppose that 7 is such that for any two coalitions X C Y C N
such that \X\ > a\Y\ (\X\ < a\Y\, resp.J we have -yx > alY (ix < a7y> resp.). Then
4>(N) = N if and only if \N\ = fcm>Q where k\^a = 1 and /cTO>Q = \km-i^aja\ + 1 for m > 1,
where [z\ denotes the integer part of z.
4- There exists 6 > such that maxijgjv {li/lj} < 1 + <5 implies that \X\ > a\Y\ (]X\ <
a \Y\
,
resp.) whenever -yx > ccyy (ix < alYi resP-)- In particular, coalition X £ C is self-
enforcing if and only if \X\ = km
^
a for some m (where kma is defined in Part 3).
This proposition shows that although it is impossible to make any general claims about
the size of coalitions without restricting the distribution of power within the society, a tight
characterization of the structure of the URC is possible when individuals are relatively similar
in terms of their power.
5.4 Power and the Structure of Ruling Coalitions
One might expect that an increase in a—the supermajority requirement—cannot decrease the
size of the URC. One might also expect that if an individual increases his power (either exoge-
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nously or endogenously) , this should also increase his payoff. However, both of these are generally
not true. Consider the following simple example: let w (•) be given by (1). Then coalition (3, 4, 5)
is self-enforcing when a = 1/2, but is not self-enforcing when 4/7 < a < 7/12, because (3,4)
is now a self-enforcing and winning subcoalition. Next, consider game T with a — 1/2 and five
players A, B, C, D, E with powers -yA = -y'A = 2, 7S = iB = 10, 7C = -y'c = 15, 7D = iD = 20,
7s = 21, and iE = 40. Then $ (N, 7, w, a) = {A, D, E}, while $ (N, 7', w, a) = {B, C, D}, so
player E, who is the most powerful player in both cases, belongs to $ (N, 7, w, a) but not to
$(iV,V,iu, a).
We summarize these results in the following proposition (proof omitted).
Proposition 5 1. An increase in a may reduce the size of the ruling coalition. That is, there
exists a society N, a power mapping 7 and a, a' 6 [1/2, 1), such that a' > a but for all X 6
<fr (JV, 7, W, a) and X' e $ (N, 7, w, a/), \X\ > \X'\ and jx > jx ,.
2. There exists a society N, a £ [1/2, 1), two mappings 7, 7' : N —» M++ satisfying ryi — 7^
/or a/Z i ^ j, 7,- < 7'- sucft. ftoi je$ (AT, 7, u;, a), 6ui j ^ $ (TV, 7', w, a). Moreover, this result
applies even when j is the most powerful player in both cases, i.e. j[ = 7^ < j3 < 7'- for all
Intuitively, higher a turns certain coalitions that were otherwise non-self-enforcing into self-
enforcing coalitions. But this impUes that larger coalitions are now less likely to be self-enforcing
and less likely to emerge as the ruling coalition. This, in turn, makes larger coalitions more
stable. The first part of the proposition therefore establishes that greater power or "agreement"
requirements in the form of supermajority rules do not necessarily lead to larger ruling coalitions.
The second part implies that being more powerful may be a disadvantage, even for the most
powerful player. This is for the intuitive reason that other players may prefer to be in a coalition
with less powerful players so as to receive higher payoffs.
This latter result raises the question of when the most powerful player will be part of the
ruling coalition. This question is addressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Consider the game V (N, 7, w (•) , a) with a € [1/2,1), and suppose that
7ii • • 1 1\N\ is an increasing sequence. If 7^ £ (a Ej=2
_1
lj/ i1 ~ a) > a E^'i"
1
Ijl ( l ~ a )j >
then either coalition -N is self- enforcing or the most powerful individual, \N\, is not a part of the
URC.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We presented an analysis of political coalition formation in nondemocratic societies. The ab-
sence of strong institutions regulating political decision-making in such societies implies that
individuals competing for power cannot make binding promises (for example, they will be un-
able to commit to a certain distribution of resources in the future) and they will also be unable
to commit to abide by the coalitions they have formed. This latter feature implies that once
a particular ruling coalition has formed, a subcoalition can try to sideline some of the original
members. These considerations imply that ruling coalitions in nondemocratic societies should
be self- enforcing, in the sense that there should not exist a self-enforcing subcoalition that can
sideline some of the members of this ruling coalition. This implies that coalition formation in
such political games must be forward-looking; at each point, individuals have to anticipate how
future coalitions will behave. Despite this forward-looking element, we showed that self-enforcing
ruling coalitions can be determined in a relatively straightforward manner. In particular, we
presented both an axiomatic analysis and a noncooperative game of coalition formation, and
established that both approaches lead to the same set of self-enforcing ruling coalitions. More-
over, because such coalitions can be characterized recursively (by induction), it is possible to
characterize the key properties of self-enforcing ruling coalitions in general societies.
Our main results show that such ruling coalitions always exist and that they are generically
unique. Moreover, a coalition will be a self-enforcing ruling coalition if and only if it does not
possess any subcoalition that is sufficiently powerful and self-enforcing. We also demonstrated
that, although equilibrium ruling coalitions are robust to small perturbations, the elimination
of a member of a self-enforcing coalition corresponds to a "large" shock and may change the
nature of the ruling coalition dramatically. This result provides us with a possible interpretation
for the large purges that took place in Stalin's Politburo following deaths of significant figures.
Finally, we showed that although ruling coalitions can, in general, be of any size, once we
restrict attention to societies where power is relatively equaUy distributed, we can make strong
predictions on the size of ruling coalitions (for example, with majority rule, a = 1/2, the ruling
coalition must be of the size 2 fc — 1, where k is an integer).
Naturally, the result that the ultimate ruling coalition always exists and is genetically unique
depends on some of our assumptions. In particular, the assumption that there is no commitment
to future divisions of resources is crucial both for the uniqueness and the characterization results.
Other assumptions can be generalized, however, without changing the major results in the paper.
For instance, the payoff functions can be generalized so that individuals may sometimes wish to
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be part of larger coalitions, without affecting our main results.
Other interesting areas of study in this context relate to some of the results presented in
Section 5. For example, we saw that individuals with greater power may end up worse off. This
suggests that individuals may voluntarily want to relinquish their power (for example, their
guns) or they may wish to engage in some type of power exchange before the game is played.
Some of these issues were discussed in the working paper version of our paper, Acemoglu, Egorov
and Sonin (2006), and developing these themes in the context of more concrete problems appears
to be a fruitful area for future research. The two most important challenges in future research
are to extend these ideas to games that are played repeatedly and are subject to shocks, and to
relax the assumption that individuals that are sidelined have no say in future decision-making.
Relaxing the latter assumption is particularly important to be able to apply similar ideas to
political decision-making in democratic societies.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider first the properties of the set M (A) in (6) and the mapping
(j>{X) in (5) (Step 1). We then prove that <p(X) satisfies Axioms 1-4 (Step 2) and that this is
the unique mapping satisfying Axioms 1-4 (Step 3). Finally, we establish that when Assumption
2 holds, 4> is single valued (Step 4). These four steps together prove both parts of the theorem.
Step 1: Note that at each step of the induction procedure, M. (A') is well-defined because
Z in (6) satisfies \Z\ < \X\ and thus <$> has already been defined for Z. The argmin set in (5) is
also well defined, because it selects the minimum of a finite number of elements (this number is
smaller than 2^1; A is a subset of I, which is finite). Non-emptiness follows, since the choice
set includes X. This implies that this procedure uniquely defines some mapping <p (which is
uniquely defined, but not necessarily single-valued).
Step 2: Take any X 6 C. Axiom 1 is satisfied, because either 4>{X) = A" (if \X\ = 1) or is
given by (5), so <f>{X) contains only subsets of X such that 4>{X) =£ 0. Furthermore, in both
cases 4> (X) contains only winning (within A) coalitions, and thus Axiom 2 is satisfied.
To verify that Axiom 3 is satisfied, take any Y 6 <f>(X). Either Y = X or Y 6 M. (A). In
the first case, Y E
<f> (X) = <f> (Y), while in the latter, Y G <p (Y) by (6).
Finally, Axiom 4 holds trivially when |A| = 1, since there is only one winning coalition. If
\X\ > 1, take Y 6 4>{X) and Z C A, such that Z £ Wx and Z G <j){Z). By construction of
4> (A), we have that
Y 6 argmin /yA .
AeM(X)U{X}
Note also that Z £ M (A) U {A} from (6). Then, if
Z $ argmin jA ,
AeM(X)u{X}
we must have ^z > jy, and vice versa, which completes the proof that Axiom 4 holds.
Step 3: We next prove that Axioms 1-4 define a unique mapping
<f>.
Suppose that there
exist <p and <fi' ^ <p that satisfy these axioms. Then, Axioms 1 and 2 imply that if [A| = 1, then
<f> (A) = 4>' (A) = A; this is because (p (A) ^ and <j> (A) C Cx and the same applies to </>' (A).
Therefore, there must exist k > 1 such that for any A with \A\ < k, we have (f>(A) = 4> (^)>
and there exists X £ C, \X\ = k, such that (p (A) ^ (jJ (A). Without loss of generality, suppose
Y e (p (X) and Y (£ $ (A). Take any Z & 4>' (A) (such Z exists by Axiom 1 and Z f Y by
hypothesis). We will now derive a contradiction by showing that Y $. (p(X).
We first prove that ^z < jy H Y = A, then ^z < jy follows immediately from the
fact that Z ^ Y and Z C A (by Axiom 1). Now, consider the case Y ^ X, which implies
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\Y\ < k (since Y C X). By Axioms 2 and 3, Y £ <j> (X) implies that Y £ Wx and Y £ <f> (Y);
however, since \Y\ < k, we have
<f>
(Y) =
<f>' (Y) (by the hypothesis that for any A with \A\ < k,
4>{A) = 4>'{A)) and thus Y £ </>' (Y). Next, since Z £ <p' (X), Y £ Wx , Y £ </>' (Y) and
Y £ (p1 (X), Axiom 4 implies that 7z < 7y.
Note also that Z £
<f>' (X) implies (from Axioms 2 and 3) that Z £ Wx and Z £ <j>' (Z).
Moreover, since ~jz < 7y, Z ^ X and therefore \Z\ < k (since Z C X). This again yields
Z £ 4>(Z) by hypothesis. Since Y £ 4>{X)
,
Z £ <j>{Z) , Z £ Wx, 7z < 7y> Axiom 4 implies
that Z £ 4>{X). Since Z £ <j>(X), Y £ <p(Y),Y £ Wx, lz < 7y> Axiom 4 implies that
Y $l 4> {X), yielding a contradiction. This completes the proof that Axioms 1-4 define at most
one mapping.
Step 4: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. If \X\ = 1, then 4>{X) = {X} and the conclusion
follows. If \X\ > 1, then <fi{X) is given by (5); since under Assumption 2 there does not exist
Y,Z £ C such that yy = 7z>
argmin 7^
A&M(X)u{X}
must be a singleton. Consequently, for any \X\, <j) (X) is a singleton and (p is single-valued. This
completes the proof of Step 4.
Proof of Lerrlma 1: This lemma is proved by induction on the maximum length of histories
of T (the number of steps in subgame I\).
Base. If T/i includes one last step only, this means that the current coalition is some X and
the current step is voting by the last voter v is voting over the last agenda setter's proposal
P = X. In this case, F implies that the URC must be R = X = ipx {X) = Fx (0) and it does
not depend on v's vote. Moreover, there are no more eliminations, hence each player i who was
not eliminated before receives Wi (R) — ejh, which coincides with both (15) and (16).
Step. Suppose that the result is proven for all proper subgames of F^. Consider two cases.
Case 1: The current step is voting. Then, proposal P will be accepted if and only if
V+ L){i £ {v} U V : i votes y in ok) £ Wx (recall the definitions of V, V~ and V+ from the text
as the set of future voters, the set of those that have voted h and the set of those that have voted
y respectively). If P is accepted, the URC will be X if P = X, while ifP ^ X, the game will have
a transition to P, after which the URC will be Fp (P) = x (P) by induction (recall that after
transition the game proceeds to an agenda-setting step). In both cases, the URC R = ipx (P)-
If P = X, player i £ X gets Wi (X) — ejh, which equals (15). If P ^= X, player i £ P receives
Wi (R) — e (jh + 1 + i{R^p\l{i£R\) , which in this case equals (15), while player i £ X\P obtains
w~ — ejh, which again equals (15) because i ^ y (P) C P. On the other hand, if proposal P is
rejected, then the game ends when the voting ends if A = (then R = X = Fx (0) = Fx (A)
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and each player i 6 X gets Wi (R) — ejh, which equals (16)) or, if A ^ 0, the game continues
with some b 6 X as agenda-setter and the remaining set of agenda-setters being B = A \ {b}.
In the latter case, we know by induction that R = Fx (J3 U {6}) = Fx {A) will be the URC, and
the payoff player i £ X receives is given by (16).
Case 2: The current step is agenda-setting; suppose player a is to propose P = Fx (a).
Note first that such P satisfies ipx (P) = P- Indeed, this automatically holds if P = X, while
if P ± X, then tpx (P) = x {P), but for P = Fx (a) ^ X we must have X (P) = P by (11), so
ipx (P) = P- Consider two subpossibilities. First, suppose P = Fx (A\J {a}). Then, as (14)
suggests, each player i 6 ipx (P) W1U vote V- Note that ipx (P) 1S necessarily winning within
X: if P = X it follows from X = tpx (P) s VVx, while if P ^ X, then, as we just showed,
ipx (P) = P = Fx (a) which is winning by (11). This means that if proposal P = Fx {A U {a}),
it is accepted, and R = P = Fx (A U {a}) both in the case P = X and P ^ X (in the latter case,
R = ipx (P) by induction, and ipx (P) = P)- Payoffs in this case are given by (16) because there
are no more transitions if P = X and exactly one more transition if P ^ X, and only players in
P get the additional — e. Second, consider the case P ^ Fx (A U {a}). Then 7fx M) — Ttyv(.p)'
for 'ypx iA) > 7j/> (p) would imply that minimum in (12) for Y = A U {a} ^ is reached at
Fx (a) = ipx (P) = P and thus P = Fx {A U {a}) which leads to a contradiction. But then,
as (14) suggests, all players in Fx (A) 6 Wx will vote against proposal P, and thus P will be
rejected. We know by induction that then R = Fx {A) and the payoffs are given by (16). This
completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 2: Profile ok involves only pure strategies. Applying Lemma 1 to the
first stage where h
.
= 0, we deduce that the URC under gk is -F/v (N) = x (-W) = K, and
payoffs are given by (16) which equals (7) because jh = (there were no eliminations before
and N = X, K = R). The theorem is therefore proved if we establish that profile ax is a SPE.
To do this we show that there is no profitable one-shot deviation, which is sufficient since T is
finite.
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there is a one-shot profitable deviation after history
h; since only one player moves at each history, this is either voter v or agenda-setter a. Let us
start with the former case, which is then subdivided into two subcases.
Subcase 1: suppose voter v votes y in a^ (this means v 6 i^x (P) c P), but would be
better off if he voted n. In profile ok, the votes of players who vote after voter v (those in
V) do not depend on the vote of player v. Hence, if proposal P is accepted in equilibrium,
deviating to h can result in rejection, but not vice versa. This deviation may only be profitable
if voter v is pivotal, so we restrict attention to this case. From Lemma 1, the URC will be
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ipx (-P) if proposal P is accepted and Fx (A) if P is rejected; the number of transitions will be
between and 2 (including transition from X to P if P ^ X) in the first case and either or
1 in the second case, so the number of transitions matters only if wv (ipx (P)) = wv {Fx (A))
(see (2)). Let us prove that v € Fx {A), 7px (A) — 7i/> (P)> and P ^ Fx (Au{a}). First,
since deviation is profitable, v
€ Fx (A) (recall that v € ipx (P) simply because v votes y in
o~k)- Second, if instead rypx i J\) > 7i/> (p); this would imply wv (Fx (A)) < wv (ipx (P)) due to
Assumption 1. Third, if instead P = Fx {A U {a}), then ipx (P) = P (f°r m this case either
P = X or P = Fx (i) for some i £ X; the first case is trivial while the second is considered in
the proof of Lemma 1). But we just showed that either 1fx {A) < lij> IP) or 1fx {A) = lij> IP)-
In the first case, the minimum in (12) for Y = A U {a} cannot be achieved at ipx (P) =
P because n(Fx (A)) < n(ipx (P)) and FX (A) is feasible in this minimization problem, so
P t^ Fx {A U {a}) which is a contradiction. In the second case, wv (Fx (A)) = wv (ipx (P)),
and since Fx (A) ± X if and only if ipx (P) ^ X (Fx (A) '= X ± ipx (P) would contradict
1fx {A) = 7v> (P)> an<^ so would Fx (A) j£ X = ipx (P))} tne number of additional transitions is
the same. Hence, deviation to n is not profitable because with or without this deviation player v
would get wv (Fx (A)) — e (jh + I{fx (A)^lx})- This contradiction proves that P ^ Fx (A U {a}).
This, together with v £ Fx (A) and T^M) < 1i/jx ip) implies that voter v must vote h in profile
ax, which contradicts the assumption that he votes y.
Subcase 2: suppose that voter v votes h in gk, but would be better off voting y. Again,
this deviation does not change other voters' votes, it can only change the URC from Fx (A)
to ipx (P) and is only profitable if v is pivotal. Consider two possible cases. If v ^ ipx (P),
voting y gives v exactly w~ — e (jh + 1) (v G P, so v is part of transition from X to P, and
Lemma 1 implies that transition from P to ipx (P) ¥" P W1^ proceed in one step, so v will
participate in exactly one more transition). Voting n will then result in at most one additional
transition, so v obtains a payoff no less than wv (Fx (A)) — e (jh + 1)- This implies that the
payoff of player v from voting h is at least as large as his payoff from deviating to y, thus
deviation is not profitable. On the other hand, if v 6 ipx (P)> then, as implied by equation
(14), v e Fx (A), ^iFx(A) — lib (P)> an<^ P ¥" Px (A\J {a}). By Lemma 1, if v votes h, the
URC is Fx (A) and he receives payoff wv (Fx (A)) — e (jh + I{FX (A)^X})> if ne votes y, the
URC is ij)x (P) and he receives wv (ipx (P)) - s (jh + I{p/A'} (l + hi'xiP)^}))- But nfFx (A) <
lipx (P) imphes wv (Fx (A)) > wv (tpx (P)), so the deviation could only be profitable for v if
I{FX (A)?X} > 1{P^X} (1 + 1 {i>x (P)¥=P})- This can only be true if FA- (A) + X and ipx (P) = P =
X. In this case, however, strict inequality 7fx m) < 7,/, ip\ holds, and therefore wv (Fx (A)) >
wv (ipx (P)). Then (2) implies that deviation for v is not profitable. This completes the proof
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that no one-shot deviation by a voter may be profitable.
The remaining case is where agenda-setter a has a best response Q ^ P, and P = Fx (a)
does not belong to the best response set. Consider two subcases. Subcase 1: suppose coalition
P is accepted if proposed; in that case, Q cannot be rejected under profile ok- The reason is
as follows: if Q were rejected, then the URC would be Fx (A). If i 6 Fx (A), then coalition
Fx (A) is feasible in minimization problem (11), which means that wa {Fx (A)) < wa (P). If
this inequality is strict, so wa (Fx (A)) < wa (P), then deviation to Q is not profitable; if
wa (Fx (A)) = wa (P), then the either Fx (A) = P = X or neither Fx (A) nor P equals X, but
in both cases a participates in the same number (0 or 1, respectively) of extra transitions, so
utility from proposing P and Q is the same and the deviation is not profitable either. If, however,
i ^ Fx (A), then proposing Q will give a payoff w~ — ejh while proposing P will give at least
wa (P)—e (jh + 1) (again, ipx (P) = P for P = Fx (a)), so deviation is again not profitable. This
proves that Q must be accepted, which immediately implies that ipx (Q) £ Wx (only members of
ipx (Q) vote f°r Q m aK, see (14)), and then Q 6 Wx because ipx (Q) c Q- We next prove that
^x (Q) = Q- Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that ipx (Q) ¥" Q'-> this immediately implies
Q 7^ X and thus ipx (Q) = X (Q)- If a proposed tpx (Q) instead of Q, it would be accepted, too.
Moreover, the fact that %isa projection implies that ipx (V'x (Q)) = ^x (x (Q)) = X (x (Q)) =
X (Q) = V'x (Q)- In addition, any player i who votes y if Q is proposed is part of ipx (Q), and
therefore would participate in voting for ipx (Q)'> moreover, he would vote y under ax in that
case, too, because ipx (Q) ¥" Fx (A U {a}) implies Q ^ Fx (A U {a}) (otherwise Q would satisfy
'fix (Q) = Q)> an(I fr°m (14) one can see that anyone who votes n if ipx (Q) 1S proposed would
also vote n if Q were proposed. Therefore, ipx (Q) would be accepted if proposed, but proposing
ipx (Q) would result in only one transition while proposing Q would result in two. Agenda-setter
a must be in ipx {Q)i so proposing ipx (Q) 1S better than proposing Q, which contradicts the
assumption that Q is a best response for a and establishes that ipx (Q) = Q- Finally, for a to
propose Q, a G Q must hold. We have proved that coalition Q is feasible in minimization (11)
for i = a, and Q ^ P implies n (P) < n (Q). But in that case either 7p < -Jq (then a prefers
having P instead of Q as the URC, even if it means an extra transition) or -yP = -fq (then
a is indifferent, because the number of transitions is the same because both P = tpx (P) and
Q = ^x (Q))- These arguments together imply that deviation to Q is not profitable for a when
P will be accepted under ax-
Subcase 2: suppose coalition P is rejected if proposed. Clearly, Q must be accepted, for
otherwise the payoffs under the two proposals are identical and Q is not a profitable deviation.
Since P = ipx (P) 1S winning within X, but is not accepted, then, from (14), 7fx {A) — ^-ipx (p )
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and P 7^ Fx (A U {a})- As in the- previous case we can show that Q € Wx, i>x (Q) = Q> and
a e Q. Since Q is accepted, (14) implies that either "(Fx{.A) > libxiQ) ox Q = ^X (AL) {a}),
for otherwise members of winning coalition Fx (A) would vote against Q in ax and Q would
be rejected. In both cases, n(Q) < n(P) (in the first case because *jq = 7,/, (Q) < 1fx (A) ^
lib (P) = iPi ano- in the second case because P = Fx {a) is feasible in minimization (12) for
Y = Au{a}, and P ^ Q). This means, however, that P cannot be the outcome in minimization
(11) for i = a because Q is also feasible (Q e Wx, a, 6 Q, and x (Q) = Q because ipx (Q) = Q
and Q ^ X where the latter follows from n (Q) < n(P)). This, however, contradicts that
P = Fx (a) by construction of profile ax in (14). Therefore, there is no profitable deviation at
the agenda setting step either. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 2: This proof also uses induction on the number of steps in IV
Base: If only one step remains, then the current ruling coalition is some X, and this step
must be voting by the last voter v over proposal P = X made by the last agenda-setter.
Regardless of the vote (and therefore in either profile), coalition X will be the URC, and each
player i S X will receive payoff W{ (X) — ejh', each players in N \ X will receive the same payoff
under both profiles, because the intermediate coalitions and the number of transitions each
player faced is the same because histories up to the last step are identical.
i
Step. Take any history h and denote the first player to act in subgame Fh by b and the
payoff to player i when b plays action £ by Ui (£). By induction this value is the same both if
profile a and ax is played thereafter. Consequently, if some action is optimal for player b if
' profile a is played in subgames of Th, the same is true if profile ax is played, and vice versa.
Let £K be the action played by b in profile ax and £ be an action played in profile a with a
non-zero probability. Then both £K and £ must yield the same payoff for b because both are
optimal when ax is played thereafter. Thus Ub (£#•) = Ub (£o)-
It therefore suffices to show that both action £ followed by equilibrium play of profile ax
and action £K followed by equilibrium play of the same profile ax result in the same URC and
the same payoff for ah players i £ N (then by induction, action £ followed by equilibrium play
of profile a will result in the same URC and payoffs). This is clearly true when £ = £x- Now
consider the case where £ ^ £K . Both action £K and action £ , accompanied by equilibrium
play of profile ax, will result in 0, 1, or 2 additional eliminations, as follows from Lemma 1:
after the first elimination, if any, equilibrium play will have at most one more elimination. This,
together with (2), implies that \wb (Rq) - Wb (Rx)\ < 2e and Wb (Rq) = Wb (Rx), where Rq and
Rx are URCs if £ and £,x are played by b, respectively. There are two possibilities.
First, consider the case u>b (Rq) = w^ (Rx) 7^ wb > then b € Rq, b G Rx, hence jRq = Jrk ,
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and by Assumption 2, Rq = Rk , so that the URC is the same in both cases. The number of
transitions is also the same (because b participates in all transitions and is indifferent between
£ and £K ). If there are no more transitions, then each player i £ X obtains utility W{ (Rq) — ejh
for both actions. If there is exactly one transition from X to Rq, then player i 6 Rq gets
w i {Ro) — £ (jh + 1) and player i 6 X \ Ro gets w~ — ejh- Consider the case where there are
exactly two transitions both after £ and £K . This cannot be the case if the first step of Th is
agenda-setting, for in that case Lemma 1 implies that if action £K played under profile <jk, the
equilibrium play involves only one more transition. Then the first step of T/j is voting over some
proposal P; moreover, both action £ and £K will result in acceptance of this proposal, for a
rejection,- again by Lemma 1, would lead to only one extra transition. But in that case the two
additional transitions are from X to P and from P to ipx (P) ¥" P- This establishes that each
player i £ X receives the same payoff regardless of whether b plays action £ or £K .
Second, consider the case Wb(Ro) = Wb(Rx) = w^ . Suppose first that b is agenda-setter;
then action £K corresponds to making proposal P = Fx (b). Then, as implied by Lemma 1, the
URC is Fx (b) that b is part of (this happens if P is accepted) or Fx {A) which b may or may
not be part of (this happens if P is rejected); here A is the set of would-be agenda-setters. In
the case under consideration b £ Rk, hence Rk = Fx {A) and Ub (£#) = w^ — ejh- Action £ is
the proposal of some coalition Q ^ P such that b & Q. If Q is accepted, but b £ Rq, then b has
an extra transition to Q but is eventually eliminated, so he receives Ub (£o) = wb ~ £ tih + 1)
and this contradicts Ub (£.k) = ^fc(Co)- Therefore, Q must be rejected, the URC must be
Ro = Fx (A) = Rk, and each player i £ Rq will receive Wi (Rq) — £ (jh + 1) while i G X \ Rq
gets Wi (Rq) — ejh in the case of either action. Now suppose that b is voting over some proposal
P, then b £ P. Then one of actions £ and £K is y and the other h. For the action to matter,
proposal must be accepted if y is played and rejected if fi is played (or vice versa, but this is
impossible under <x^-). But recall that voter b is not a member of Rq and Rr. Therefore, b
votes y, he receives w~ — e(jh+ 1) (he does not participate in the second transition, which will
happen under ok because b e P and b ^ Rq, b $ R^). On the other hand, if b votes n, then by
Lemma 1 he receives w^ — ejh, because there is only one transition in which b is eliminated. But
this means that Ub (y) j^ Ub (fi), so Ub (£o) ¥" Ub (£a')> which implies that b cannot be indifferent
between the two actions £ and £K , thus yielding a contradiction.
We have therefore proved that after either of the two actions £ and £K is played, the URC
is the same and each player i £ X is indifferent. But any player i 6 N \ X is indifferent, too,
because in this case the payoffs are entirely determined by history h. This completes the proof
of the step of induction, and therefore of Lemma 2.
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Proof of Theorem 3: The proof follows immediately from the application of Lemma 2 to
the entire game T, which is starting with history h = 0. The lemma then implies that the URC
in any SPE must coincide with that under the strategy profile uk, i-e. K, and payoffs must be
given by (7), as implied by Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3: (Part 1) The set A{N) may be obtained from R++ by subtracting
a finite number of hyperplanes given by equations ^x = ^Y f°r au X,Y e P (AT) such that
X ^Y and by equations -yy = afx f°r au X,Y £ P (N) such that X cY. These hyperplanes
are closed sets (in the standard topology of R++), hence, a small perturbation of powers of a
generic point preserves this property (genericity). This ensures that A(N) is an open set; it is
dense because hyperplanes have dimension lower than \N\. The proofs for S (AT) and J\f (N) are
by induction. The base follows immediately since S (N) = R++ and M (N) = are open sets.
Now suppose that we have proved this result for all k < \N\. For any distribution of powers
{fi}ieN> N is self-enforcing if and only if there are no proper winning self-enforcing coalitions
within N. Now take some small (in the sup-metric) perturbation of powers {"f'i}ieN - If this
perturbation is small, then the set of winning coalitions is the same, and, by induction, the
set of proper self-enforcing coalitions is the same as well. Therefore, the perturbed coalition
{7^} is self-enforcing if and only if the initial coalition with powers {7^} is self-enforcing; which
completes the induction step.
(Part 2) Take any connected component A C A (N). Both S (N) n A and N (AT) n A are
open in A in the topology induced by A (N) (and, in turn, by K++) by definition of induced
topology. Also, (S (N) n A) n {Af (N) n A) = and {S [N)T\ A) U (A/ (AT) n A) = A, which,
given that A is connected, implies that either S (N) D A or J\f [N) n A is empty. Hence, A lies
either entirely within S (N) or N (N). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: The first two parts follow by induction. If N = 1, for any 7 and
a, $ (N, 7, w, a) = {N}. Now suppose that this is true for all N with \N\ < n; take any society
N with \N\ = n. We then use the inductive procedure for determining $ (N, 7, w, a), which is
described in Theorem 1. In particular, Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that the set M. (N) in (6)
is identical for r (N, 7,10, a), F (N,j',w,a), and T (N,j,w,a'), provided that 5 is sufficiently
small (the result self-enforcing coalitions remain self-enforcing after perturbation follows from
Lemma 3). Moreover, if 5 is small, then 7^ > 7y is equivalent to 7^ > j'Y . Therefore, (5)
implies that $ (N, 7, w, a) = $ (N, 7', w, a) = $ (AT, 7, w, a'). This completes the proof of parts
1 and 2.
The proof of part 3 is also by induction. Let |Ai| = n. For n — 1 the result follows
straightforwardly. Suppose next that the result is true for n. If 5 is small enough, then
<f>
(N\) is
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winning within N = N\ U N2; we also know that it is self-enforcing. Thus we only need to verify
that there exists no X C N\U N2 such that (j>(X) = X (i.e., X that is self-enforcing, winning
in N\ U N2 and has 7^ < Jmjji))- Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that this is not the case
(i.e., that the minimal winning self-enforcing coalition X
€ P (N\ U N2) does not coincide with
<p(Ni)). Consider its part that lies within JVi, X n N\. By definition, 7^ > Imni) > Ix ^
7xnNi 1 where the strict inequality follows by hypothesis. This string of inequalities implies that
X n N\ is a proper subset of N\, thus must have fewer elements than n. Then, by induction, for
small enough S,
<f> {X n N\) — <j) (X) = X (since X is self-enforcing). However, <j> (X n iV*i) C Ni,
and thus X C N\. Therefore, X is self-enforcing and winning within N\ (since it is winning
within N\ U N2). This implies that 7^/jVi) ^ 7x (since 4>{N\) is the minimal self-enforcing
coalition that is winning within TVi). But this contradicts the inequality 7,/,(/v1 ) > Ix and
implies that the hypothesis is true for n + 1. This completes the proof of part 3.
Proof of Proposition 2: (Part 1) Either X is stronger than Y or vice versa. The stronger
of the two is a winning self-enforcing coalition that is not equal to X UY. Therefore, X U Y is
not the minimal winning self-enforcing coalition, and so it is not the URC in X U Y.
(Part 2) For the case of adding, it foUows directly from Part 1, since coalition of one player
is always self-enforcing. For the case of elimination: suppose that it is wrong, and the coalition
is self-enforcing. Then, by Part 1, adding this person back will result in a non-self-enforcing
coalition. This is a contradiction which completes the proof of Part 2.
Proof of Proposition 3: (Part 1) Given Part 3 of Proposition 1, it is sufficient to show
that, there is a self-enforcing coalition M of size m (then adding n — m players with negligible
powers to form coalition iV would yield (j>(N) = cj>{M) = M). Let i G M = {l,...,m} be
the set of players. If m = 1, the statement is trivial. Fix m > 2 and construct the following
sequence recursively: 7j = 2, 7 fc > Xw=i lj for all fc = 2, 3, . . . , m — 1, 7m = Y2T=i 7j ~ ! ^ *s
straightforward to check that numbers {7i}; ej^ are generic. Let us check that no proper winning
coalition within M is self-enforcing. Take any proper winning coalition X; it is straightforward
to check that \X\ > 2, for no single player forms a winning coalition. If coalition X includes
player m (with power 7m ), then it excludes some player k with k < m; his power 7 fc > 2 by
construction. Hence,
m—
1
m—
1
7m = Yl 7j - 1 > Yl Tj - 7fc > 7x\{m},
which means that player m is stronger than the rest, and thus coalition M is non-self-enforcing.
If X does not include rym , then take the strongest player in X; suppose it is k, k < m — 1.
However, by construction he is stronger than all other players in X, and thus X is not self-
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enforcing. This proves that M is- self-enforcing. However, if \X\ = 2 and Assumption 2 holds,
then one of the players, say player i, is stronger than the other one, and thus {i} is a winning
self-enforcing coalition. But then, by Corollary 1, X cannot be self-enforcing.
(Part 2) The proof is identical to Part 1. The recursive sequence should be constructed as
follows: 7j = 2, 7 fc > a £^lj lj for all fc = 2, 3, ... . ,m - 1, 7m = a YJj^i lj - 1-
Proof of Proposition 4: (Part 1) This part follows as a special case of Part 3. To see
this, note that the condition in Part 4 is satisfied
,
since for any X C Y C N, \X\ ^ a \Y\ -*=*>
\X\ ^ |y\JT| => ix ^ 1y\x "*==** lx ^ alY f°r Q = 1/2- Moreover, the sequences of
fcm 's in Part 1 and in Part 3 are equal since k\ — 2 1 — 1 = 1, and if fcm-i = 2m_1 — 1 then
fcm = 2
m
— 1 = |_2fcm
_iJ + 1 and thus the desired result follows by induction.
(Part 2) Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that the claim is false, i.e., that for some
X,Y C N such that \X\ > \Y\ we have jx < jY - Then the same inequalities hold for X' =
X \ (X n Y) and Y' = Y \ (X D Y), which do not intersect, so that £jex' Jj < T,jev lj- This
implies Zjex> 7,7> < ZjeY' 7i/A, and thus £ieX, (7,/A - l) + |X'| < £^yi (7j./A - l)+|y'|.
Rearranging, we have
isM-M<Eff-i).-E(?-^ £ It- 1 !-
However, X' and y' do not intersect, and therefore this violates (17). This contradiction com-
pletes the proof of Part 2.
(Part 3) The proof is by induction. The base is trivial: a one-player coalition is self-
enforcing, and \N\ = k\ = 1. Now assume the claim has been proved for all q < \N\, let us prove
it for q = \N\. If \N\ = km for some m, then any winning (within N) coalition X must have
size at least a (|_A;m_i/aJ + 1) > km-\ (if it has smaller size then 7^ < a~fN ). By induction, all
such coalitions are not self-enforcing, and this means that the grand coalition is self-enforcing.
If
I
TV
I
^ km for any m, then take m such that fcm_i < \N\ < km- Now take the coalition of
the strongest km-\ individuals. This coalition is self-enforcing by induction. It is also winning
(this follows since km-\ > a [km-i/a\ = a(km — 1) > a|7V|, which means that this coalition
would have at least a share of power if all individuals had equal power, but since this is the
strongest km-\ individuals, the inequality will be strict). Therefore, there exists a self-enforcing
winning coalition, different from the grand coalition. This implies that the grand coalition is
non-self-enforcing, completing the proof.
(Part 4) This follows from Part 3 and Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 6: Inequality 7^1 > a Yl]=2 Ijl U — a ) implies that any coalition
that includes |7V|, but excludes even the weakest player will not be self-enforcing. The inequality
32
7|jvi < a Y^j=2 Ijl (1 ~~ a ) implies that player \N\ does not form a winning coalition by himself.
Therefore, either TV is self-enforcing or (j> (TV) does not include the strongest player.
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